Stichting OPEN misses opportunities to accelerate circular transition with AVV application
This article analyses the new AVV application by Stichting OPEN for e-waste. It demonstrates that collection targets have not been met for years, governance is primarily determined by producers, and the Action Plan 2025–2030 barely focuses on reuse and extending product lifespan. In addition, critical questions are raised about the functioning of the AVV instrument and the limited influence of stakeholders within the consultation procedure.

A Declaration of Universal Binding (Algemeen Verbindend Verklaring, AVV) is a far-reaching instrument: it grants a single producer responsibility organisation (PRO) a statutory monopoly in the implementation of extended producer responsibility (EPR). In the Netherlands, several EPR systems operate under an applicable AVV, including Verpact for packaging and Stichting OPEN for electrical and electronic equipment (EEE). Stichting OPEN has been the sole party implementing EPR for EEE since 2021; the first AVV was granted in that year for a period of five years and expires on 31 December 2025. For this reason, Stichting OPEN submitted a new request for an AVV in April 2025. At the same time, Stichting OPEN's system has failed to meet the statutory collection targets for years.
With this article, we respond to Stichting OPEN's new request for an AVV and to the draft decision of the State Secretary for Infrastructure and Water Management (IenW). Our response focuses on four key points: (1) governance within Stichting OPEN, (2) the circularity ambition of the 2025–2030 Action Plan, (3) the operation of the current AVV instrument, and (4) the consultation procedure and the extent to which stakeholders can genuinely exert influence on the draft decision currently under consideration.
1 - Governance structure of Stichting OPEN
Increasing attention is being drawn to the lack of inclusive decision-making within PROs. For instance, municipalities have an unclear role, many service providers are dependent on the PROs, and it is difficult for the government to enforce regulations. For this reason, there have long been calls for inclusive governance, in which a broader group of value chain actors is represented on the board of PROs. In order to assess Stichting OPEN's application, the governance structure is one of the elements we examined.
The 2024 AVV Monitoring Report shows that Stichting OPEN is structured with a management board, an advisory council, a procurement company (B.V.), and an alliance that serves as a value chain partnership. The division of tasks is as follows. The board sets the rates and the budget and consists mainly of representatives from
producer trade associations, including Stichting Lightrec, APPLIA Nederland Stichting E-waste Circulair (ANStEC), Stichting Zonne-energie Recycling Nederland (now merged into Holland Solar), and Stichting Metalelektrorecycling. The Advisory Council consists of representatives of civil society and academic organisations, such as ROVA, FNV, the Consumentenbond, Capgemini, and provides non-binding, strategic advice. The implementation of procurement and contracting is housed in Afvalbeheerstructuur AEEA B.V., managed by the procurement manager at Stichting OPEN.
Although this structure appears broad on paper, in practice there are several points that merit attention. Firstly, voting weights on the board are based on the volume of products placed on the market represented by the parties, which means that larger producers have directly more influence on decision-making. Other chain parties, such as municipalities and repairers, have no formal decision-making power, even though they play an important role in achieving the statutory targets. This distribution of votes raises the question of whose interests are primarily being served. Ultimately, the interests of a party such as Miele or Bosch are indeed quite different from those of a party such as Fairphone.
Via the Advisory Council and the Alliance, Stichting OPEN does involve a broad group of stakeholders in projects and thematic elaboration, but these consultative groups have no role in strategic decision-making. Involving a broader group of stakeholders in actual decisions ensures an appropriate balance among interests and offers significant opportunities to make better use of opinions and expertise across the value chain.
In addition, there are indications of insufficient transparency in the tariff and cost structure within Stichting OPEN, as was noted during the producers' council of ANStEC. The transparency of a PRO, especially one in a monopoly position, is essential to ensure the availability of reliable information, clear financial agreements, and the possibility of enforcement.
The governance of Stichting OPEN is therefore formally broad in scope, but in practice producer-dominated, with limited transparency and insufficient participation by value chain partners. Opportunities for improvement remain here, which are not being seized in the new AVV application.
2 - The 2025–2030 Action Plan
Stichting OPEN has drawn up an Action Plan 2025–2030 with fifteen priority actions, with which it expects to achieve the collection target of 85% of waste EEE from Directive 2012/19 in 2028. This action plan has been included as a key component of the AVV request, as it forms part of the substantiation of effectiveness. Although the State Secretary already indicates in the draft decision that this action plan is supposedly in line with the NPCE goals for life extension and high-grade recycling of critical raw materials, among others, in practice the plan focuses almost exclusively on collection and recycling, giving minimal consideration to preparation for reuse.
The fifteen proposed measures are located mainly on the lower rungs of the R-ladder. Prevention, life extension, reuse, and circular design are not developed, or only to a limited extent. The actions regarding reuse are primarily logistical optimisations that facilitate reuse, but do not stimulate it; they hardly focus on repair, refurbishment, or life extension. The vast majority of the actions are aimed
at collection and recycling, which are useful for meeting the collection target, but do not contribute to achieving the higher R-strategies (prevention, life extension, reuse) in the chain. Including a mandatory reuse target for Stichting OPEN, as also proposed in the parliamentary committee debate on the circular economy in September 2025, could partially correct this. This could, for example, be incorporated into the announced revision of Directive 2012/19. However, the greater potential for Stichting OPEN lies in actively promoting circularity across the entire electronics chain, not just in the waste phase.
Concrete actions for this are therefore lacking in the action plan. This is striking, because existing initiatives in the Netherlands, such as the Lang Leve Elektronica (LLE) coalition, demonstrate precisely that measures in the use phase are indeed possible and effective. The LLE coalition works on concrete solutions for better use and longer lifespan of appliances. These initiatives prove that when the value chain is brought together, considerable circular gains can be achieved.
What is not included in the Action Plan, but is mentioned in the 2024 Monitoring Report, is that Stichting OPEN provides funding to Repair Café, participates in the LLE coalition, and has been involved in pilots by BKN, among other things. They are also a project partner of the E-waste race, which focuses on education. These activities are valuable, but given their central position within the EPR system, a more proactive and pioneering role would be appropriate, with an initial opportunity already lying in the Circular Electronics Value Chain Taskforce set up by Stichting OPEN.
3 - The instrument of universal binding declaration
The main question is whether granting a monopoly position to a party via an AVV actually leads to better-performing EPR systems. So far, a definitive answer to this question is lacking. In the case of Stichting OPEN, it appears that the targets have not been met for years, while substantial financial resources flow back to the producers. This completely contradicts the 'polluter pays' principle.
In a letter from the State Secretary on the further development of EPR, it is acknowledged that concentration of power as a result of an AVV entails risks, including potential negative side effects for the market and competitive conditions. The same letter also announces the EPR further development trajectory aimed at safeguarding greater circularity in EPR, in which Rijkswaterstaat is, among other things, examining the functioning of the AVV instrument itself in one of the five work packages. Results are expected to be sent to Parliament by the end of 2025.
In addition, research by Utrecht University emphasises that there are concerns about the representativeness of PROs with which producers are obliged to affiliate via an AVV. The study shows that not all producers feel adequately represented in a monopoly PRO. The NVRD and its members also often have different interests from the PRO. Furthermore, there are doubts as to whether a monopoly PRO genuinely leads to better-performing EPR systems, as described in an earlier article by Fair Resource Foundation about Stichting OPEN.
Internationally, the Dutch approach is exceptional. In countries such as Belgium (with Recupel for EEE), producers can also submit an individual waste management plan and affiliation with a single PRO is not mandatory. Although an exemption from the AVV can be requested in the Netherlands, the fact remains that an AVV is not an inherent part of EPR, but a policy choice in the Netherlands.
The assessment framework for an AVV is based on the criterion of effective waste management (Art. 15.36 of the Environmental Management Act). In practice, however, effectiveness is interpreted primarily as efficiently collected and recycled waste, while the higher rungs of the R-ladder are hardly taken into account. This is reflected in Stichting OPEN's Action Plan 2025–2030.
In the draft decision, the system has once again been assessed as effective, on the grounds that the Action Plan makes it plausible that the targets will be met in 2028 and that the AVV provides financial stability. However, this assessment is identical to that of the previous AVV application, even though the targets at that time were not achieved. This demonstrates that the effectiveness criterion is not applied with sufficient rigour in practice, particularly because the highest steps of the R-ladder are not taken into account and there are few consequences when Stichting OPEN structurally fails to meet the targets. The assessment should therefore critically examine the objective and the absence of targets before the designation 'effective' can be granted.
4 - The consultation procedure
The procedure for an AVV application, laid down in Section 3.4 of the General Administrative Law Act, includes a six-week consultation period for the prepared draft decision, during which interested parties can submit views. Following this phase, the final decision is adopted, and lodging an appeal is no longer possible.
Although the consultation period offers room for public participation, in practice questions arise about the actual opportunities for stakeholders to exert influence. The public inspection period only takes place after a draft decision has already been adopted, in which the State Secretary has essentially already assessed the AVV.
We see this reflected in the current application from Stichting OPEN. Stichting OPEN submitted the application on 4 April 2025. Following the response to the request for supplementary information, the signed agreement was provided on 12 September 2025. The draft decision was published in November 2025 and a six-week public inspection period was opened. In this draft decision, the State Secretary has already determined that:
a majority of producers is purportedly represented;
the 2025–2030 Action Plan makes it sufficiently plausible that the targets will be met;
the criterion of "effective waste management" has been satisfied;
and that the application complies with the Competition Act.
Because these assessments have already been made prior to the consultation period, the question arises as to how much room remains for meaningful input from other stakeholders. Research by Utrecht University points to similar problems with the AVV procedure: although formally anyone can submit views, parties are not involved on an equal footing in the establishment of EPR schemes. The current AVV procedure for Stichting OPEN shows the same pattern. Most of the substantive discussion takes place between Stichting OPEN and Rijkswaterstaat, and other stakeholders can only respond at the end, when a decision is essentially already prepared. The example of Stichting OPEN's AVV application is used here, but these arguments also apply to other EPR systems with an AVV.
This is reinforced by questions regarding the basis on which the decisions were made. For instance, regarding competition, the assessment in the draft decision appears to be based on a legal analysis submitted by Stichting OPEN itself, without broader consultation of market parties. In addition, the results of the 'majority of producers' analysis warrant closer scrutiny. To determine the majority, the following formula was used:
A (number of producers supporting the request) / A + B (producers not supporting the request) + C (number of free-riders) x 100%.
Stichting OPEN set the number of free-riders (C) to zero in this calculation, as the number is unknown. This is despite data provided by Stichting OPEN to Rijkswaterstaat showing that an estimated 1,876 already identified free-riders are active. When this group is taken into account, the calculated representation drops from 91% to around 66%. The level of support on which the AVV application is based is then significantly lower.
Conclusions and recommendations
In its AVV application, Stichting OPEN appears not to have succeeded in its own ambition: moving from 'cute to scalable' reuse. While promises are made, such as strengthening repair initiatives and stepping up cooperation in the Circular Electronics Value Chain Taskforce, concrete, enforceable actions are lacking in the AVV application and in the 2025–2030 Action Plan to shift the focus from the back end of the chain to the front end. In addition, promises were made by Stichting OPEN regarding the provision of input during the drafting of the AVV application, where it remains unclear to what extent broad stakeholder consultation took place.
We therefore have our reservations regarding the draft decision on the AVV. We would have liked to see the State Secretary for Infrastructure and Water Management, in this assessment, take a critical look at how Stichting OPEN—in contrast to the current expiring AVV—intends to commit to accelerating the circular transition. In our view, this is a missed opportunity.
Furthermore, we wish to emphasise that the decision-making process surrounding this and future AVV applications would benefit from a more critical weighing of governance, transparency, and representativeness. It is essential that the involvement of value chain partners is not restricted to a consultative 'check the box' exercise at the end of the process, but is established early and structurally within decision-making.
We therefore see significant opportunities for improvement, both in the governance model and activities of Stichting OPEN, and in the design and application of the AVV instrument itself.




