Stichting OPEN misses opportunities to accelerate the circular transition in its application for a general binding declaration

1 – Governance structure of Stichting Open

Increasing attention is being drawn to the lack of inclusive decision-making within PROs. For example, municipalities have an unclear role, many service providers are dependent on PROs, and it is difficult for the government to enforce regulations. For this reason, there have been repeated pleas for inclusive governance, with a broader group of chain actors represented in the management of PROs. In order to assess the application of Stichting OPEN, the governance structure was one of the elements we looked at.

The AVV Monitoring Report 2024 shows that Stichting OPEN is structured with a board, an advisory council, a purchasing company, and an alliance that serves as a chain partnership. The division of tasks is as follows. The board sets the fees and the budget and consists mainly of representatives of producer industry organizations, including

Stichting Lightrec, APPLIA Nederland Stichting E-waste Circulair (ANStEC), Stichting Zonne-energie Recycling Nederland (now merged into Holland Solar), and Stichting Metalelektrorecycling. The Advisory Board consists of representatives of social and academic organizations, such as ROVA, FNV, de Consumentenbond, and Capgemini, and provides non-binding strategic advice. Purchasing and contracting are carried out by Afvalbeheerstructuur AEEA B.V., managed by the purchasing manager at Stichting OPEN.

Although this structure appears broad on paper, there are a number of points that deserve attention in practice. First, voting weights in the board are based on the number of products brought to market that the parties represent, which means that larger producers have a direct influence on decision-making. Other parties in the chain, such as municipalities and repairers, have no formal decision-making power, even though they play an important role in achieving the legal objectives. This distribution of votes raises the question of whose interests are primarily being represented. After all, the interests of a company such as Miele or Bosch are very different from those of a company such as Fairphone.

In addition, there are signs of insufficient transparency in the fees and cost structure within Stichting OPEN, as was indicated during the ANStEC producers’ council meeting. The transparency of a PRO, especially one in a monopoly position, is essential to ensure the availability of reliable information, clear financial agreements, and the possibility of enforcement. 

The governance of Stichting OPEN is therefore formally broad in structure, but in practice it is dominated by producers, with limited transparency and insufficient participation from chain partners. There is still room for improvement here, but this opportunity has not been seized in the new AVV application.

2 – The Action Plan 2025-2030

Stichting OPEN has drawn up an Action Plan 2025-2030 with fifteen priority actions, with which it expects to achieve the collection target of 85% of waste EEE from Directive 2012/19 in 2028. This action plan has been added to the AVV request, as it forms an important part of the supporting evidence for the effectiveness of the EPR system. Although the State Secretary already indicates in the draft decision that this action plan would be in line with the NPCE targets for extending the life cycle and high-quality recycling of critical raw materials, among other things, in practice the plan focuses almost exclusively on collection and recycling and pays minimal attention to preparation for reuse.

The fifteen proposed measures are mainly located on the lower steps of the R ladder. Prevention, life extension, reuse, and circular design are not or only partially elaborated. The actions related to reuse are mainly logistical optimizations that facilitate reuse but do not stimulate it; they hardly focus on repair, refurbishment, or life extension. The vast majority of the actions focus on collection and recycling, which are

useful for achieving the collection target, but do not contribute to achieving the higher R strategies (prevention, life extension, reuse). The inclusion of a mandatory reuse target for Stichting OPEN, as also proposed in the circular economy committee debate in September 2025, could partially correct this. This might, for example, be incorporated into the announced revision of Directive 12/2019. However, the greater potential for Stichting OPEN lies in actively promoting circularity throughout the entire electronics chain, not just in the waste phase.

Concrete actions to this end are hence absent from the action plan. This is striking, because existing initiatives in the Netherlands, such as the Lang Leve Elektronica (LLE) coalition, demonstrate that measures in the use phase are indeed possible and effective. The LLE coalition is working on concrete solutions for better use and longer life spans of electronics. These initiatives prove that when the chain is brought together, significant circular gains can be made. 

Not included in the Action Plan, but referred to in the 2024 Monitoring Report, is that Stichting OPEN provides funding to Repair Café, participates in the LLE coalition, and has been involved in BKN pilots. They are also a project partner in the E-waste race, which focuses on education. These activities are valuable, but given their central position within the EPR system, a more proactive and pioneering role would be appropriate, with an initial opportunity already available in the Taskforce Circulaire Elektronica Keten set up by Stichting OPEN.

3 – The instrument of Generally Binding Declarations 

The most important question is whether granting a monopoly position to a party with an AVV actually leads to better performing EPR systems. To date, there is no clear answer to this question. In the case of Stichting OPEN, it appears that the objectives have not been achieved for years, while a lot of financial resources are flowing back to the producers. This is completely contrary to the ‘polluter pays’ principle.

In a letter from the State Secretary on the further development of EPR, it is acknowledged that the concentration of power resulting from an AVV entails risks, including possible negative side effects for the market and competitive conditions. The same letter also announces the current EPR revision (Doorontwikkeltraject UPV) with the aim of ensuring greater circularity in EPR, in which Rijkswaterstaat is investigating, among other things, the functioning of the AVV instrument itself in one of the five work packages. Results are expected to be sent to parliament at the end of 2025.

In addition, research conducted by Utrecht University emphasizes that there are concerns about the representativeness of PROs that producers are required to join through a collective agreement. The research shows that not all producers feel well represented in a monopoly PRO. The NVRD and its members also often have interests that differ from those of the PRO. Furthermore, there are doubts as to whether a monopoly PRO actually leads to better performing EPR systems, as described in an earlier article by Fair Resource Foundation about Stichting OPEN.

Internationally, the Dutch approach is exceptional. In countries such as Belgium (with Recupel for EEE), producers can also submit an individual waste management plan and are not required to join a single PRO. Although it is possible to apply for an exemption from the AVV in the Netherlands, the fact remains that an AVV is not a natural part of EPR, but a policy choice in the Netherlands.

The assessment framework for an AVV is based on the criterion of effective waste management (Art. 15.36 Environmental Management Act). In practice, however, effectiveness is mainly interpreted as efficiently collected and recycled waste, while the higher steps of the R ladder are hardly taken into account. This is reflected in the Action Plan 2025–2030 of Stichting OPEN.

In the draft decision, the system is once again assessed as effective, because the Action Plan would make it plausible that the objectives will be achieved in 2028 and because the AVV offers financial stability. However, this assessment is identical to that of the previous AVV application, even though the objectives at that time were not achieved. This shows that the effectiveness criterion is not being applied rigorously enough in practice, especially since the highest steps of the R ladder are not taken into account and there are few consequences if Stichting OPEN fails to achieve its objectives on a structural basis. The assessment should therefore take a critical look at the objective – and the lack of objectives – before the designation “effective” can be granted.

4 – The consultation procedure

The procedure for an AVV application, laid down in Section 3.4 of the General Administrative Law, includes a six-week consultation period for the draft decision, during which interested parties can submit their views. After this phase, the final decision is made, and it is no longer possible to appeal. Although the consultation period provides opportunities for

participation, in practice questions arise about the actual influence that stakeholders can exert. The consultation period only takes place after a draft decision has already been made, in which the State Secretary has already assessed the AVV.

This is reflected in the current application from Stichting OPEN. Stichting OPEN submitted the application on April 4, 2025. After responding to the request for additional information, the signed agreement was submitted on September 12, 2025. The draft decision was published in November 2025 and a six-week consultation period was opened. In this draft decision, the State Secretary has already determined that:

• A majority of producers are represented;
• the Actionplan 2025–2030 sufficiently demonstrates that the objectives will be achieved;
• the criterion of ‘effective waste management’ is met;
• and that the application complies with the Competition Act.

Since these assessments were already completed prior to the consultation period, the question arises as to how much room remains for meaningful participation by other stakeholders.

Research conducted by Utrecht University points to similar problems with the AVV procedure: although formally anyone can submit opinions, parties are not involved equally in the development of EPR arrangements. The current AVV procedure for Stichting OPEN shows the same pattern. Most of the substantive discussion takes place between Stichting OPEN and Rijkswaterstaat, and other stakeholders can only respond at the end, when a decision has already been made. The example of Stichting OPEN’s AVV application has been taken here, but these arguments also apply to other EPR systems with an AVV.

This is reinforced by questions about the basis on which the decisions were made. For example, with regard to competition, the assessment in the draft decision appears to be based on a legal analysis submitted by Stichting OPEN itself, without broader consultation with market players. In addition, the results of the ‘majority of producers’ calculation deserve further analysis. The majority was determined on the basis of: 

A (number of producers supporting the request) / A + B (producers not supporting the request) + C (number of free riders) x 100%.

Conclusions and recommendations

In its AVV application, Stichting OPEN appears to have failed in its own ambition: to move from “cute to scalable” (schatting naar schaalbaar) reuse. Although promises are made, such as strengthening repair initiatives and intensifying cooperation in the Taskforce Circulaire Elektronica Keten, the AVV application and the Action Plan 2025-2030 lack concrete, enforceable actions to shift the focus from the back end of the chain to the front end. In addition, Stichting OPEN has made promises about providing input during the drafting of the AVV application, but it is unclear to what extent broad stakeholder consultation has taken place.

We therefore have our reservations about the draft AVV decision. We would have wished that the State Secretary for I&W had taken a critical look at how Stichting OPEN – in contrast to the current expiring AVV – intends to accelerate the circular transition. In our view, this is a missed opportunity.

In addition, we would like to emphasize that the decision-making process surrounding these and future AVV applications would benefit from a more critical assessment of governance, transparency, and representativeness. It is essential that the involvement of chain partners is not limited to a consultative “check the box” exercise at the end of the process, but is established early on and structurally in the decision-making process.

We therefore see significant opportunities for improvement, both in the governance model and activities of Stichting OPEN, and in the design and application of the AVV instrument itself.

Attachments (in Dutch)

• 002 Request for AVV waste management contribution agreement WEEE
• 007 Appendix 3_Note concerning general competition aspects
• 020 20250611 Request for additional information PBAAV25002 AVV WEEE
• 033 Draft decision avv WEE 2025
• Response to questions from RWS